Rządowy projekt ustawy o ratyfikacji Porozumienia o Międzynarodowym Programie Energetycznym, sporządzonego w Paryżu dnia 18 listopada 1974 r., ze zmianami z dnia 30 listopada 2007 r.

RECOGNISING that other Member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development may desire to join in their efforts,

CONSIDERING the special responsibility of governments for energy supply,

CONCLUDE that it is necessary to establish an International Energy Program to be
implemented through an International Energy Agency, and to that end,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article 1

l.
The
Participating
Countries shall implement the International Energy Program as
provided for in this Agreement through the International Energy Agency, described in Chapter IX,
hereinafter referred to as the “Agency”.

2.
The term “Participating Countries” means States to which this Agreement applies
provisionally and States for which the Agreement has entered into and remains in force.

3.
The term “group” means the Participating Countries as a group.
CHAPTER I
EMERGENCY SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Article 2
l.
The Participating Countries shall establish a common emergency self-sufficiency in oil
supplies. To this end, each Participating Country shall maintain emergency reserves sufficient to
sustain consumption for at least 60 days with no net oil imports. Both consumption and net oil imports
shall be reckoned at the average daily level of the previous calendar year.

2.
The Governing Board shall, acting by special majority, not later than 1st July, 1975, decide
the date from which the emergency reserve commitment of each Participating Country shall, for the
purpose of calculating its supply right referred to in Article 7, be deemed to be raised to a level of 90
days. Each Participating Country shall increase its actual level of emergency reserves to 90 days and
shall endeavour to do so by the date so decided.

3.
The term “emergency reserve commitment” means the emergency reserves equivalent to 60
days of net oil imports as set out in paragraph 1 and, from the date to be decided according to
paragraph 2, to 90 days of net oil imports as set out in paragraph 2.



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Article 3
1.
The emergency reserve commitment set out in Article 2 may be satisfied by:

-
oil stocks,
-
fuel switching capacity,
-
stand-by oil production,

in accordance with the provisions of the Annex which forms an integral part of this Agreement.

2.
The Governing Board shall, acting by majority, not later than 1st July, 1975, decide the
extent to which the emergency reserve commitment may be satisfied by the elements mentioned in
paragraph 1.



Article 4
1.
The Standing Group on Emergency Questions shall, on a continuing basis, review the
effectiveness of the measures taken by each Participating Country to meet its emergency reserve
commitment.

2.
The Standing Group on Emergency Questions shall report to the Management Committee,
which shall make proposals, as appropriate, to the Governing Board. The Governing Board may,
acting by majority, adopt recommendations to Participating Countries.
CHAPTER II
DEMAND RESTRAINT

Article 5
1. Each
Participating
Country
shall at all times have ready a program of contingent oil
demand restraint measures enabling it to reduce its rate of final consumption in accordance with
Chapter IV.

2.
The Standing Group on Emergency Questions shall, on a continuing basis, review and
assess:

- each Participating Country's program of demand restraint measures,
- the effectiveness of measures actually taken by each Participating Country.

2.
The Standing Group on Emergency Questions shall report to the Management Committee,
which shall make proposals, as appropriate, to the Governing Board. The Governing Board may,
acting by majority, adopt recommendations to Participating Countries.
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CHAPTER III
ALLOCATION
Article 6
l.
Each Participating Country shall take the necessary measures in order that allocation of oil
will be carried out pursuant to this Chapter and Chapter IV.

2.
The Standing Group on Emergency Questions shall, on a continuing basis, review and
assess:

- each Participating Country's measures in order that allocation of oil will be carried out
pursuant to this Chapter and Chapter IV,
- the effectiveness of measures actually taken by each Participating Country.

3.
The Standing Group on Emergency Questions shall report to the Management Committee,
which shall make proposals, as appropriate, to the Governing Board. The Governing Board may,
acting by majority, adopt recommendations to Participating Countries.

4.
The Governing Board shall, acting by majority, decide promptly on the practical
procedures for the allocation of oil and on the procedures and modalities for the participation of oil
companies therein within the framework of this Agreement.



Article 7
1.
When allocation of oil is carried out pursuant to Article 13, 14, or 15, each Participating
Country shall have a supply right equal to its permissible consumption less its emergency reserve
drawdown obligation.

2.
A Participating Country whose supply right exceeds the sum of its normal domestic
production and actual net imports available during an emergency shall have an allocation right which
entitles it to additional net imports equal to that excess.

3.
A Participating Country in which the sum of normal domestic production and actual net
imports available during an emergency exceeds its supply right shall have an allocation obligation
which requires it to supply, directly or indirectly, the quantity of oil equal to that excess to other
Participating Countries. This would not preclude any Participating Country from maintaining exports
of oil to non-participating countries.

4.
The term “permissible consumption” means the average daily rate of final consumption
allowed when emergency demand restraint at the applicable level has been activated; possible further
voluntary demand restraint by any Participating Country shall not affect its allocation right or
obligation.

5.
The term “emergency reserve drawdown obligation” means the emergency reserve
commitment of any Participating Country divided by the total emergency reserve commitment of the
group and multiplied by the group supply shortfall.

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6.
The term “group supply shortfall” means the shortfall for the group as measured by the
aggregate permissible consumption for the group minus the daily rate of oil supplies available to the
group during an emergency.

7.
The term “oil supplies available to the group” means

- all crude oil available to the group,
- all petroleum products imported from outside the group, and
- all finished products and refinery feedstocks which are produced in association with
natural gas and crude oil and are available to the group.

8.
The term “final consumption” means total domestic consumption of all finished petroleum
products.



Article 8
1.
When allocation of oil to a Participating Country is carried out pursuant to Article 17, that
Participating Country shall

- sustain from its final consumption the reduction in its oil supplies up to a level equal to
7 per cent of its final consumption during the base period,
- have an allocation right equal to the reduction in its oil supplies which results in a
reduction of its final consumption over and above that level.

2.
The obligation to allocate this amount of oil is shared among the other Participating
Countries on the basis of their final consumption during the base period.

3.
The Participating Countries may meet their allocation obligations by any measures of their
own choosing, including demand restraint measures or use of emergency reserves.



Article 9
1.
For purposes of satisfying allocation rights and allocation obligations, the following
elements will be included:

- all crude oil,
- all petroleum products,
- all refinery feedstocks, and
- all finished products produced in association with natural gas and crude oil.

2.
To calculate a Participating Country’s allocation right, petroleum products normally
imported by that Participating Country, whether from other Participating Countries or from non-
participating countries, shall be expressed in crude oil equivalent and treated as though they were
imports of crude oil to that Participating Country.

3.
Insofar as possible, normal channels of supply will be maintained as well as the normal
supply proportions between crude oil and products and among different categories of crude oil and
products.

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4.
When allocation takes place, an objective of the Program shall be that available crude oil
and products shall, insofar as possible, be shared within the refining and distributing industries as well
as between refining and distributing companies in accordance with historical supply patterns.



Article 10
1.
The objectives of the Program shall include ensuring fair treatment for all Participating
Countries and basing the price for allocated oil on the price conditions prevailing for comparable
commercial transactions.

2.
Questions relating to the price of oil allocated during an emergency shall be examined by
the Standing Group on Emergency Questions.



Article 11
1.
It is not an objective of the Program to seek to increase, in an emergency, the share of
world oil supply that the group had under normal market conditions. Historical oil trade patterns
should be preserved as far as is reasonable, and due account should be taken of the position of
individual non-participating countries.

2.
In order to maintain the principles set out in paragraph l, the Management Committee shall
make proposals, as appropriate, to the Governing Board, which, acting by majority, shall decide on
such proposals.
CHAPTER IV
ACTIVATION
Article 12
Whenever the group as a whole or any Participating Country sustains or can reasonably be
expected to sustain a reduction in its oil supplies, the emergency measures, which are the mandatory
demand restraint referred to in Chapter II and the allocation of available oil referred to in Chapter III,
shall be activated in accordance with this Chapter.



Article 13
Whenever the group sustains or can reasonably be expected to sustain a reduction in the
daily rate of its oil supplies at least equal to 7 per cent of the average daily rate of its final
consumption during the base period, each Participating Country shall implement demand restraint
measures sufficient to reduce its final consumption by an amount equal to 7 per cent of its final
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